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Shareholder Value and UK Companies: A Positivist Inquiry

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Abstract

It has generally been maintained that UK companies embrace a shareholder value approach. But some commentators have challenged that view. This article documents an attempt to ascertain the actual position in UK companies by an analysis of the position taken concerning corporate objective by 50 of the largest companies in the UK. The research consists of an examination of the public documents of these companies, namely those that could be accessed from the companies’ websites, and the primary document considered was the company’s most recent Annual Report. The study found that companies could be divided into three groups with one group consisting of 36% of the companies considered, stating that they have shareholder value as their ultimate goal. But, critically, it also found that most of these companies indicated that non-shareholding stakeholders were important to them.

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  1. Centre for Business Law and Practice, School of Law, University of Leeds, UK

    Andrew Keay (Professor of Corporate and Commercial Law) & Rodoula Adamopoulou (Researcher)

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Keay, A., Adamopoulou, R. Shareholder Value and UK Companies: A Positivist Inquiry. Eur Bus Org Law Rev 13, 1–29 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1017/S1566752912000018

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