Better the devil you know than a world you don't? Intolerance of uncertainty and worldview explanations for belief in conspiracy theories

Highlights

• Two explanations for endorsement of Conspiracy Theories (CTs) are examined.

• No evidence was found for the role of intolerance of uncertainty.

• CTs related to a worldview as threatening, non-random, and with no fixed morality.

• Representative heuristic use also related to CT endorsement.

Abstract

Conspiracy Theory (CT) endorsers believe in an omnipresent, malevolent, and highly coordinated group that wields secret influence for personal gain, and credit this group with the responsibility for many noteworthy events. Two explanations for the emergence of CTs are that they result from social marginalisation and a lack of agency, or that they are due to a need-to-explain-the-unexplained. Furthermore, representativeness heuristics may form reasoning biases that make such beliefs more likely. Two related studies (N = 107; N = 120) examined the relationships between these social marginalisation, intolerance of uncertainty, heuristics and CT belief using a correlational design. Overall, intolerance of uncertainty did not link strongly to CT belief, but worldview variables did — particularly a sense of the world as (socially) threatening, non-random, and with no fixed morality. The use of both representative heuristics that were examined was heightened in those participants more likely to endorse CTs. These factors seem to contribute to the likelihood of whether the individual will endorse CTs generally, relating similarly to common CTs, CTs generally historically accepted as “true”, and to the endorsement of fictional CTs that the individual would find novel. Implications are discussed.

Introduction

In the month of the assassination of JFK, Richard Hofstadter outlined the ‘paranoid style’ of thinking that he believed was characteristic of conspiracy theory (CT) endorsement (later published in 1965). CT endorsers, Hofstadter argued, engage in gross distortions of logical reasoning in support of a belief in an omnipresent, malevolent, and highly coordinated group that secretly influences events for their own gain. Unlike sufferers of clinical paranoid delusions (who may see the world as set against them), the paranoid-style conspiracist sees a world full of oblivious people who are reliant on them to expose the truth (Hofstadter, 1965, Wood and Douglas, 2013). Hofstadter cited historical examples of CT beliefs – from Illuminati theories to Communist sympathiser plots – and while the intervening years potentially render these ‘classic’ examples quaint, CTs persist. Princess Diana's death and the 9/11 attack on the Twin Towers are notable examples of recent events for which official explanations have been dismissed by CT believers in favour of more sinister schemes perpetrated by clandestine groups (Swami et al., 2010, Wood and Douglas, 2013, Wood et al., 2012). The tragic disappearance of Malaysian Airlines flight MH370 in March 2014 led to over a dozen CTs within three months (Hartley-Parkinson, 2014). Generally, then, CTs are defined as a proposed plot by powerful people or organisations working together in secret to accomplish some goal, typically of sinister purpose (Douglas and Sutton, 2008, Goertzel, 1994, Wood and Douglas, 2013); such theories are not – by definition – necessarily false (Wood & Douglas, 2013).

It is sometimes argued that these ‘unofficial accounts’ pose little concern (Clarke, 2002), are normative (“The paranoid style is American Politics”, Walker, 2013, p.1, original italics), and may even serve a pro-social purpose in helping to uncover truths such as the Watergate conspiracy (Bale, 2007, Swami and Coles, 2010). However, others argue that there are negative effects due to CTs. Jolley and Douglas (2014b) found that those exposed to information about government CTs were less inclined to be politically engaged, and similar results have been found for the effect of CTs regarding climate science with respect to pro-environmental behaviours (Jolley & Douglas, 2014b), and anti-vaccination CTs on the intent to vaccinate a hypothetical child (Jolley & Douglas, 2014a). CT beliefs have been linked to political extremism and terrorist actions, such as the Oklahoma City Bombing (Sunstein & Vermeule, 2008). Receivers of CT information also tend to experience the “Third Person Effect” - believing that they are less susceptible to the effects of pro-CT information than are others, and they therefore fail to recognise the negative effects CTs can exert (Douglas & Sutton, 2008). Further, when a CT is found to have a legitimate basis (such as the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment, in which African Americans infected with syphilis were deliberately left untreated by medical professionals claiming to provide free healthcare; Thomas & Quinn, 1991), this can serve as a foundation or ‘proof’ for other, similar CTs to which a person may be exposed (such as HIV/AIDs being a means of deliberate African American genocide; Goertzel, 1994, Jolley and Douglas, 2014b). Put simply, the existence of “Documented misbehaviour inevitably fueled speculations about undocumented misbehaviour” (Walker, 2013 p.160).

Clearly then, CT beliefs and their root causes are a concern to society. While it was once argued that CT ideation was evoked by anger in defence of political views (Hofstadter, 1965), pathologising of this sort has largely fallen out of favour (Jolley & Douglas, 2014b). Supplanting it has been the search for ‘sub-clinical correlates’ (Jolley & Douglas, 2014b p.36), which largely fall into either coping-with-alienation-and-powerlessness, or need-to-explain-the-unexplained categories (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999, Swami and Coles, 2010), although such explanations are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The present paper will examine these theories of individual differences in conspiracist belief in two studies. The first will examine alienation explanations; while the second will consider also the intolerance of uncertainty explanations, along with possible reasoning mechanisms mediating such effects.

CTs have been argued to exist more prominently in the disenfranchised or disadvantaged members of the population (Hofstadter, 1965). It has been noted that individuals who endorse CTs are likely to be higher in powerlessness, social isolation and anomia¹ (Swami & Coles, 2010) which is broadly defined as a subjective disengagement from social norms. Such disengagement from the normative social order may result in greater conspiratorial thinking for a number of related reasons. First, individuals who feel alienated may consequently reject conventional explanations of events, as they reject the legitimacy of the source of these explanations (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999). Due to these individuals feeling alienated from their peers, they may also turn to conspiracist groups for a sense of belonging and community (Darwin, Neave, & Holmes, 2011), or to marginalised subcultures in which CTs are potentially more rife. People who feel powerless may also endorse CTs as they also help the individual avoid blame for their predicament (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999). In this sense, CTs give a sense of meaning, security and control over an unpredictable and dangerous world (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999). Finally, and most simply, conspiracy beliefs – which imply a level of Machiavellianism and power enacted by those without fixed morality – are most likely to resonate with people who feel powerless and believe that society lacks norms.

Empirical studies have investigated these notions. In examining a number of correlates, Abalakina-Paap et al. (1999) found the strongest relationship between endorsement of specific CTs and anomia and powerlessness, as well as correlations between general conspiracist ideation and an external locus of control, rather than CTs relating to a need to explain complex events. This aligned with earlier findings that conspiracy beliefs were related to anomia (Goertzel, 1994). From this, Abalakina-Paap and colleagues concluded that conspiracist ideation arose from social marginalisation and a lack of agency rather than a need-to-explain-the-unexplained. Related findings come from Swami et al. (2010) who found that CT belief related to political cynicism along with a greater support for democratic principles. Finally, Douglas and Sutton (2011) found in two studies that Machiavellianism was related to CT belief — concluding that one reason for endorsement of conspiracies is the belief that you yourself would do the same actions if in the same place of power (i.e., “it takes one to know one”).