The Hotelling–Downs model with runoff voting
Highlights
► Hotelling–Downs model with office-seeking candidates and runoff voting is studied. ► It is shown that in this model Nash equilibria in pure strategies always exist. ► Both convergent and divergent equilibria are possible. ► Two-policy equilibria exist under any distribution of votersʼ ideal policies. ► More than two-policy equilibria exist generically under additional conditions.
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