Cross-country evidence on teacher performance pay☆
Research highlights
▶ Combines country performance-pay measures with PISA-2003 achievement data. ▶ Estimates student-level international education production functions. ▶ Countries with performance-related pay score 1/4 standard deviations higher. ▶ No bias from within-country selection; robust to continental fixed effects. ▶ Robust to controlling for non-performance-based forms of teacher salary adjustments.
Introduction
Educational reform discussions around the globe regularly include the idea of paying teachers based on how they perform in advancing their students’ educational achievement. From a theoretical viewpoint, performance-related pay may elicit both incentive effects – raising motivation and effort of current teachers who strive to increase their pay – and sorting effects – attracting and retaining graduates in the teaching profession who expect to do well under performance-based compensation schemes.1 Given recent evidence that teacher quality is very important for student achievement but unrelated to most observable teacher characteristics,2 motivating teachers to perform well and attracting a pool of high-performing teacher applicants are promising policies to improve student outcomes. This paper provides international evidence whether variation in the use of performance-related pay for teachers is associated with student achievement across countries.
The best available evidence on the effects of teacher performance pay stems from a set of recent experimental studies performed in Israel, Kenya, and India.3 However, there are obvious limits to what we can learn from such experimental studies. Because of their short-term character, experimental studies are bound to miss any sorting effect into the teaching profession, which is “perhaps the most important aspect of compensation effects” (Lazear, 2003, p. 186). In addition, while experimental studies cleanly identify the short-term incentive effect for current teachers, long-term incentive effects may differ. On the one hand, time required to accustom oneself to incentives contracts may render the long-term incentive effect larger than the identified short-term incentive effect. On the other hand, adjustments to the detriment of non-incentivized teaching tasks4 as well as regular experience of failure may render it smaller. Furthermore, it is unclear to what extent the available experimental evidence generalizes to developed countries. The available non-experimental evidence for developed countries5 has the additional interpretation problem that better schools may choose to adopt teacher performance pay and that teachers and students may select themselves into schools on the basis of whether there is performance-related pay or not, possibly introducing substantial selection bias.
One way of capturing long-term effects of teacher performance pay, including general-equilibrium effects of attracting different pools of teachers, while at the same time getting around within-system selection bias, is to draw on cross-country variation to compare countries that do and do not use teacher performance pay. A number of countries have extensive experience with performance-related adjustments of teacher salaries, whereas other countries do not.6 We combine country-level indicators of the use of performance-related pay with the micro database of the 2003 Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) to estimate international education production functions that account for a rich set of family, school, and institutional determinants of student achievement at the individual, school, and country levels. Based on data for 190,000 students who form a representative sample of 15-year-olds in 28 OECD countries, the analysis provides descriptive evidence on the association between the use of salary adjustments for teacher performance (at the national level) and student achievement on an internationally comparable test. While the list of topics analyzed using international education production functions is long – including the effects of family background, resources, teacher salary levels, accountability, school autonomy, choice, tracking, and more7 – to our knowledge this is the first cross-country econometric study to address the topic of teacher performance pay.
We find that students in countries that adjust teacher salaries for outstanding performance in teaching perform about 25% of a standard deviation higher on the international math test than students in countries without teacher performance pay, after controlling extensively for student, school, and country measures. Similar associations are found for reading achievement, and somewhat smaller, but still substantial and significant associations for science achievement. While there are only limited signs of effect heterogeneity overall, there is some indication that the association is stronger where parents have higher socioeconomic background, but also for students who speak a foreign language at home. Tertiary degrees in pedagogy of teachers are positively associated with student achievement in countries without teacher performance pay, but not in countries with teacher performance pay.
Using international variation for the identification of effects of teacher performance pay has several advantages over national studies, but also clear limitations.8 At the most basic level, cross-country evidence can exploit institutional variation that is usually not available, or only available at a much more limited scale, within single countries. A main additional advantage is that cross-country evidence is able to capture the long-run, general-equilibrium effects of teacher performance pay that often elude studies in a single country. Another additional advantage is that by using measures of teacher performance pay aggregated at the country level, cross-country evidence circumvents the selection issues that usually plague within-country identification.
Obvious limitations of cross-country identification relate to the limited number of independent observations available at the country level and the possibility of measurement error in national reported data on the use of teacher performance pay. More fundamentally, possible issues of omitted country variables and reverse causation make identification less clean than in randomized experiments. For example, countries with low student achievement may feel pressure to introduce teacher performance incentives, which would bias the estimated effect of teacher performance pay downward. More generally, the use of teacher performance pay may be related to other unobserved country factors, such as general cultural features or the use of pay adjustment mechanisms more generally, that are themselves related to student achievement.
We implement a series of specification tests to check whether some of these remaining concerns with cross-country identification are likely to be a major source of bias in our estimates. In particular, to address issues of divergent national cultures around the world, we show that our results are robust to – and even stronger in – specifications that include continental fixed effects or restrict the analysis to European countries only. To address issues of possible correlation with the general prevalence of more flexible teacher pay schemes, the international database allows us to control for a rich set of indicators of the availability of teacher salary adjustments for other, non-performance-related criteria, such as based on teaching conditions and responsibilities, teachers’ qualifications and training, and demographics. Hardly any of these other forms of teacher salary adjustments is significantly related to student achievement, and none of them affects the qualitative result on teacher performance pay. Apart from these falsification tests, all our models control for a rich set of about 50 family, input, and institutional factors measured at the student, school, and national level that are usually unavailable in national datasets. While these analyses rule out the most obvious sources of bias in the international identification, the limits to the interpretation of results based on an international cross-section of student achievement data mentioned above require a cautious interpretation of the reported results as descriptive associations indicative of areas of possible important effects in educational production.9
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section introduces the international data on teacher performance pay and the micro database of the PISA international student achievement test. Section 3 describes and discusses the empirical model. Section 4 presents the results of our estimations together with robustness and specification tests. Section 5 concludes.
Section snippets
Cross-country measures of teacher performance pay
In 2003, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) for the first time executed a survey among member countries about whether the base salary for public-school teachers could be adjusted based on an extensive list of criteria (see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2006, pp. 374–394, for details). One of these criteria related to salary adjustments awarded to teachers with “outstanding performance in teaching”. Among the total of 16 possible criteria
Empirical model and cross-country identification
Our basic model is a standard education production function that expresses student achievement as a function of a set of input factors:where Tisc is the achievement test score of student i in school s in country c. The variable of interest in this paper is Pc, an indicator of whether country c has performance-related teacher pay. The production function holds constant potential influence factors in the area of student-level family background B, school-level
Basic results
Table 2 reports our basic results on considering teacher performance pay in international education production functions. The dependent variable is student-level achievement on the PISA math test. Our main specification (column (1)) adds our measure of performance-related pay and the teacher salary level to the benchmark international education production function from Table 2.1 in Woessmann et al. (2009). Both the indicator of availability of teacher performance pay in a country and the
Conclusion
This paper provides first evidence on the association between the use of performance-related teacher pay and student achievement across countries. The results of cross-country education production functions that extensively control for student, school, and country background factors suggest that students in countries that make use of teacher performance pay perform significantly better in math, science, and reading than students in countries that do not use teacher performance pay. The size of
References (30)
- et al.
Evaluating the impact of performance-related pay for teachers in England
Labour Economics
(2009) Pay for performance in public and private schools
Economics of Education Review
(2001)- et al.
Individual teacher incentives and student performance
Journal of Public Economics
(2007) - et al.
The economics of international differences in educational achievement
- et al.
Sorting with motivated agents: Implications for school competition and teacher incentives
Journal of the European Economic Association
(2006) Incentives and organizations in the public sector: An interpretative review
Journal of Human Resources
(2002)- et al.
If you pay peanuts do you get monkeys? A cross country analysis of teacher pay and pupil performance
(2010) - et al.
You get what you pay for: Incentives and selection in the education system
Economic Journal
(2010) - et al.
Teacher incentives
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
(2010) - et al.
Generalizations about using value-added measures of teacher quality
American Economic Review
(2010)
Does educational tracking affect performance and inequality? Differences-in-differences evidence across countries
Economic Journal
Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization
Pulled away or pushed out? Explaining the decline of teacher aptitude in the United States
American Economic Review
Evaluating the effect of teachers’ group performance incentives on pupil achievement
Journal of Political Economy
Performance pay and teachers’ effort, productivity, and grading ethics
American Economic Review
Cited by (76)
Teacher evaluation and training
2023, Handbook of the Economics of EducationDeregulating Teacher Labor Markets
2022, Economics of Education ReviewCitation Excerpt :There may be good reasons not to have strong performance pay in the public sector: lack of competition, non-verifiable outputs, multiple tasks, and motivated agents (Dixit, 2002; Burgess and Ratto, 2003).1 There are also costs: inflexibility precludes organizations from reacting to local labor market conditions and reduced incentives for effort (Woessman, 2011). Pay that is unresponsive to both individual productivity and to local conditions is likely to lead to misallocation of resources between labor and other inputs.
Schools without a law: Primary education in France from the Revolution to the Guizot Law
2021, Explorations in Economic HistorySelecting or rewarding teachers? International evidence from primary schools
2020, Economics of Education ReviewCitation Excerpt :Since information on teachers and teaching practices is limited, the first wave of studies reviewed in Hanushek and Woessman's (2011) survey leaves teacher policies in the background. More specific on teacher compensation were Woessman (2011) and Dolton and Marcenaro-Gutierrez (2011), matching OECD aggregate information on teacher compensation to student achievements. The first contribution identifies a positive relationship between pay-to-performance and mean test scores in reading and numeracy; the second one correlates the actual and relative compensation of teachers to student test scores, exploiting cross-country and over time variations to identify the impact of the former onto the latter variable.
Addressing Changes in Professional Behavior by Teacher Bonuses: A Mixed-Methods Approach
2024, International Journal of Educational Reform
- ☆
Revised version of a paper originally prepared for the Conference on “Merit Pay: Will it Work? Is it Politically Viable?” sponsored by Harvard's Program on Education Policy and Governance, Taubman Center on State and Local Government, Harvard Kennedy School, June 2010. Helpful comments from Jonah Rockoff, Brian Jacob, and other conference participants are gratefully acknowledged. I am also thankful for the hospitality provided by the W. Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-Campbell National Fellowship of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, during my work on this paper in the first half of 2010.