A bargaining model of partisan appointments to the central bank
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Dismissal power
2023, Journal of Mathematical EconomicsUndeflected pressure? The protectionist effect of political partisanship on US antidumping policy
2018, European Journal of Political EconomyCitation Excerpt :One reason that is often mentioned to motivate the delegation of policy-making to bureaucrats is that, with the right institutional setting, they can be made independent from politics, i.e. to deflect political pressure (Anderson and Zanardi, 2009). Economists have mostly focused on the independence of central bankers (Persson and Tabellini, 2002; Rogoff, 1985; Waller, 1989, 1992).1 However, motivations for delegation also apply to other important policies and institutions.
Does government ideology matter in monetary policy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries
2012, Journal of International Money and FinanceCentral bankers in government appointed committees
2010, Journal of Public EconomicsCitation Excerpt :For the same reason, a hawk government tries to replace central bankers who vote for high inflation. This strategy on the part of the government is consistent with previous models where government appointments to the CB are partisan (e.g. Waller 1992; Havrilesky, 1995, chapter 9). The government's partisan reappointment strategy implies that voting for low inflation increases one's chances of being reappointed if the government is hawk, and decreases them if the government is dove.
Central bank boards around the world: Why does membership size differ?
2008, European Journal of Political EconomyMonetary policy by committee: Why and how?
2007, European Journal of Political Economy
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I would like to thank Roy Gardner, Tom Havrilesky, and an anonymous referee for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. All errors are mine