Abstract
In this paper, I take inspiration from some themes in Ann Murphy’s recent book, Violence and the Philosophical Imaginary, especially her argument that philosophy’s identity and relation to itself depends on an intimate relationship with that which is designated as not itself (e.g. other academic disciplines and non-philosophy in general), the latter of which is a potential source of shame that calls for some form of response. I argue that this shame is particularly acute in regard to the natural sciences, which have gone on in various ways to distance themselves from their progenitor discipline and to achieve both agreement and technical progress in a way that could never be said of philosophy. I trace out some of the reactions to this shame that have dominated in the twentieth century and been a factor in the so-called analytic-continental ‘divide’. The options here are many and varied, but they range from cannibalism (philosophy as queen of the sciences, thus conferring some of the prestige of science upon the philosophy, which alone can unite or ground the various ontic sciences), scientific naturalism (the philosopher defers to the sciences, and most forms of meta-philosophy are rejected as an outmoded remnant of first philosophy), or some kind of irenic separatism about methods or domains such that science and philosophy do not encroach upon the territory of each other. My aims here are mainly diagnostic, but I will indicate where I think that certain responses to this shame are unproductive and unhelpful, with divergent weaknesses associated with the traditions that have come to be labelled ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ respectively. My tacit suggestion, then, is that philosophy needs to become post-analytic and meta-continental, but I will also briefly criticize some recent efforts to do precisely this in what is sometimes called the ‘scientific turn’ in contemporary continental (or post-continental) philosophy.
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Notes
Drawing on the work of Badiou, Lacan and others, Justin Clemens (2012) considers psychoanalysis to be an anti-philosophy.
Of course, Wittgenstein famously notes in a letter to Rush Rhees that this quietest move was ultimately impossible for him personally, even if normatively still desirable, but it is certainly one response to the crisis of philosophy brought about by contemporary science.
Preston adds: ‘given the value, analysts have traditionally placed upon clarity and rigor, one might expect that they themselves would be alarmed by the fact that what it means to be an analytic philosopher is presently unclear. That they tend not to be is a puzzle whose explanation will become clear further on. For now, it should simply be noted that the failure of analytic philosophers to provide a meta-philosophical and methodological account of their manner of philosophizing counts as a tremendous oversight that makes their philosophizing un-philosophical in an important sense’ (Preston 2006, 8).
According to Ryle, Husserl philosophized and acted as if he had never met a scientist—of course, at Gottingen, Husserl worked with renowned mathematicians including Felix Klein and David Hilbert, as well as the physicist Max Born.
Michael Marder, however, shows the persistence of the term and idea within phenomenology in his recent book, Phenomenology Critique Logos (2014).
Although not himself advocating any such elimination, Sellars likewise recognizes that ‘Man is that being which conceives of itself in terms of the manifest image. To the extent that the manifest image does not survive […] to that extent man himself would not survive’ (Sellars 1963, 18).
In his review of Malabou’s book, Jan Slaby notes that, ‘The presentation of research in neuroscience on neuronal plasticity is highly selective and not at all up to date, shunning a lot of complexity’. He adds that Malabou’s ‘little book is in the end no more than a call to arms without much of a battle plan. Rhetorically impressive, timely, much-needed—but not more than a very first step. It is time to follow up and go to work’ (Slaby 2010).
Badiou (rightly) bemoans the suturing of philosophy to any single one of its conditions—love, art, science, politics, etc.
Slavoj Žižek also makes this point on the blurb of Malabou’s 2008 book: ‘as a rule, neuroscientists avoid two things like a vampire avoids garlic: any links to European metaphysics, political engagement and reflection upon the social conditions which gave rise to their science. Catherine Malabou does exactly this…’
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Reynolds, J. Philosophy’s Shame: Reflections on an Ambivalent/Ambiviolent Relationship with Science. SOPHIA 55, 55–70 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-016-0514-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-016-0514-4