Abstract
Do hard budget constraints work in favour or against truth telling in double auctions? McAfee (1992) constructed a simple double auction mechanism (MDA), which is strategyproof and minimally inefficient, but may resort to dual prices, where the difference between prices is channelled as a surplus to the market maker, preventing MDA from achieving a balanced budget. We construct a variant of MDA in which no-loss constraints play a major positive role. Our variant of MDA is also strategyproof, as efficient as MDA but improves on it by achieving a balanced budget via always having a uniform price.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
We are thankful to Preston McAfee for sharing this observation with us. As in a world with NLC traders, MDA maintains all its properties, it follows that in such a world our mechanism is more efficient than MDA in ex-ante sense if welfare is utilitarian. However, as explained in Sect. 4, our mechanism ceases to be strategyproof in a world where traders are not NLC.
As pointed out by a referee, there are many implementations in experiments of private-values markets in which bidding above value or below cost was ruled out by the decision interface.
We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this to us.
References
Clarke, E. (1971). Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice, 11(1), 17–33.
Chatterjee, K., & Samuelson, W. (1983). Bargaining under incomplete information. Operations Research, 31, 835–851.
Groves, T. (1973). Incentives in teams. Econometrica, 41(4), 617–631.
Kojima, F., & Yamashita, T. (2014). Double auction with interdependent values: Incentives and efficiency. Theoretical Economics (forthcoming).
Loertscher, S., & Mezzetti, C. (2014). A dominant strategy double auction with multi-unit traders. Working paper, University of Melbourne.
Loertscher, S., & Mezzetti, C. (2016). Dominant strategy, double clock auctions with estimation-based tatonnement. Melbourne: Mimeo, University of Melbourne.
Loertscher, S., Marx, L., & Wilkening, T. (2015). A long way coming: Designing centralised markets with privately informed buyers and sellers. Journal of Economic Literature, 53(4), 857–897.
McAfee, P. (1992). A dominant strategy double auction. Journal of Economic Theory, 56, 434–450.
Myerson, R., & Satterthwaite, M. (1983). Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading. Journal of Economic Theory, 29(2), 265–281.
Vickrey, W. (1965). Counterspeculation, auction, and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance, 16, 8–37.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
We thank Sandro Brusco, Nick Feltovich, Takashi Kunimoto, Simon Loertscher, Preston McAfee, Arunava Sen, Steven Williams and two anonymous referees for useful comments and suggestions.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Anbarci, N., Roy, J. Double auctions with no-loss constrained traders. Theory Decis 84, 1–9 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-017-9627-7
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-017-9627-7