Abstract
This paper provides evidence consistent with firms with Last-in-first-out (LIFO) inventory policy being priced by the market as having lower information risk than First-in-first-out (FIFO) firms. Furthermore, the paper shows that this pricing differential is sustained after controlling for accruals quality, suggesting that the inventory policy signals some information risk characteristics that are not captured by accruals quality measure. We investigate the relation between inventory policy and accruals quality and find that accruals quality is systematically worse for FIFO firms than for LIFO firms after controlling for correlated omitted variables and known firm attributes. These findings complement the currently established relationship between the cost of capital, market pricing and accruals quality by focusing on the need for understanding the incremental effects of individual accounting policies.
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Notes
The accruals quality measure was developed by Dechow and Dichev (2002). They used only the current, previous and subsequent cash flows as regressors in determining the residual whose standard deviation was defined as the accruals quality measure. This was modified by McNichols (2002) who included the change in sales and property, plant and equipment as additional regressors in the regression. Francis et al. (2005) investigated and showed the association of this measure with the cost of capital.
The “accruals anomaly” literature also examines the effect of accruals on market pricing (Sloan 1996; Richardson et al. 2005; Kraft et al. 2006; Hirshleifer et al. 2006; Khan 2007; Ng 2005). The focus of this stream of research is whether the investors rationally price the stock by considering all the systematic risks that might be indicated by the accruals (Ng 2005; Khan 2007; Kraft et al. 2006) or whether they mis-price the stocks due to fixation (Hirshleifer et al. 2006). We are not primarily interested in the accrual anomaly and whether it represents rational pricing or a behavioral phenomenon. The inventory choice policy is public information and we argue that it must necessarily represent systematic risk to be priced by the investors.
This is a counter-point to the explanation given in Penman and Zhang (2002) who argue that conservative accounting gives rise to higher investment accounts on the balance sheet which can be used by managers to manage earnings and reduce the quality of earnings. Clearly, if the LIFO reserve (which is used in constructing the C-score in their paper) is dipped into, it could create much higher variability in earnings. However, the dipping into reserves reduces the reported reserves and is part of the reported information. Therefore, investors can correct the income number (to estimate the permanent component) and it will be reflected in the stock price immediately, making the LIFO policy an unlikely signaling mechanism.
LIFO firms have significantly lower obsolescence and variability of inventory than FIFO firms. Further, LIFO firms have a significantly lower standard deviation of earnings before extraordinary items, adjusted for LIFO reserve. In Sect. 3 of the paper, we provide evidence in support of these claims. Panel A and B of Table 5 show lower obsolescence and variability whereas the last panel of Table 2 shows smaller variability of earnings for LIFO firms.
Consider private information, η m (the subscript m for managers) and public information ω in two identical firms that differ only in inventory policy. If the expected precision of private information in LIFO firm is higher than that in FIFO firm, i.e., ψ (η m |ω, LIFO) > ψ (η m |ω, FIFO), the relative weights on the public and private information in the two firms will be different. This difference in weights between private and public information results in undiversifiable information risk (Easley and O’Hara 2004).
LIFO inventory policy reduces the ability of managers to use earnings management to hide the firm’s bad performance (note that use of LIFO reserves is easily seen by investors from financial statements and cannot be argued as “hiding” performance). By choosing LIFO, managers could also signal that they will not indulge in earnings management. This is also too costly to be copied by managers who indulge in earnings management. We thank Prof. Robert Halperin for pointing this out.
FIFO firms signal both higher volatility as well as higher future sales growth (the 5-year-ahead future sales growth is 0.538 for LIFO and 1.105 for FIFO firms, and the difference is significant at 5% level). In equilibrium, the net benefit for FIFO firms of signaling higher future sales growth exceeds the cost of signaling higher volatility but for LIFO firms, the expected total benefit of tax shield and signaling lower volatility exceeds the cost of signaling lower future sales growth. In effect, this results in a separating equilibrium.
Some earlier analytical work (Hughes et al. 1988, 1994) suggests that firms that choose FIFO might forego the benefit of switching to LIFO (if any) to provide a signal of superior performance to investors. However in this study, we do not examine the effect of inventory choice on performance. Our focus is on the effect of inventory choice on accruals quality and information risk. Further, we control for the incentives to choose the inventory method in a two-stage analysis.
The random walk model for resource prices assumes that based on the current information, a systematic increasing or decreasing trend in the prices cannot be anticipated. The model captures the “real” prices after adjusting for inflation.
We thank Dan Givoly for pointing out that the difference in mean cost of goods sold between the LIFO and FIFO firms is not significant.
Auditors do not solely rely on a pre-set sampling rule. They perform an analytical review of accounts to find any outliers and choose them for investigation. In addition, they also choose other accounts randomly for investigation. We focus on the first part, i.e., the choice of accounts based on outliers.
Reporting of cash flow from operations (compustat annual data item #308) in the statement of cash flows was mandated only in 1988 across board, following SFAS No. 95 (requires firms to present a statement of cash flows for fiscal year ending after July 15, 1988). The use of this reported cash flow would limit the sample to the years 1996 onwards because the computation of AQ also requires 7 years of cash flow data. Therefore, we have chosen to report the results from the larger sample from 1976 using the computed cash flows for all years. However, we have conducted the full analysis with the reported cash flow data for the sample from 1996 to 2003 and all the results are qualitatively similar. This analysis is not reported here in the interest of brevity but is available from the authors on request.
The reason we choose firms with LIFO or FIFO as predominant inventory policy rather than for all inventories (pure LIFO or FIFO) is that multinational firms with the majority of inventory overseas are often prohibited to use LIFO overseas. The criterion of pure LIFO or FIFO policies would therefore exclude all such firms from the sample.
The number of LIFO and FIFO firms together exceeds the number of total firms because even though we require no change in inventory policy over the past 8 years, it is still possible that a firm adopted LIFO in the early part of the sample period and switched to FIFO in the later part of the sample period or vice versa.
There regressions are estimated for each Fama French 48 industry and year combination. The mean coefficients are the average values of these regression coefficients. These regressions are not tabulated and presented in the interest of brevity.
Dechow and Dichev (2002, pp. 43–44) point out that even though the firm-level time-series specification of accruals quality is theoretically better supported than the cross-sectional industry level specification, the empirical estimate is noisier in the firm-specific case because of less degrees of freedom. We use the cross-sectional measure and mitigate the effect of the measurement error by including the industry dummies in the regression.
The first stage (prediction model) is estimated on a limited sample of firms that have no missing values for the choice variables. In the second stage, the full sample is used and the predicted LIFO is computed using the coefficients estimated in the first stage. In cases where there are missing values for choice variables, the predicted LIFO variable is estimated by replacing those specific missing variables with the average value for LIFO or FIFO firms to which the observation belongs. We also estimated the second stage model using only the limited sample of the first stage. The results are not qualitatively different from those that are reported in the Table. The same variables are significant in the same direction in both cases. For the sake of brevity, the limited sample second stage results have not been tabulated. However, these results are available with the authors.
In general, we expect dipping into LIFO inventory would result in increased variability in LIFO firms which goes against our results. However, it is theoretically possible that LIFO dipping might be used as a tool to smooth earnings and this could potentially result in improved accruals quality measure. It is this last possibility that we want to avoid by using the inventory-increasing sub-sample.
As was done in the case of the sample in Table 5, the first stage prediction model is computed using the firms that have no missing values for the choice variables. However, the second stage is based on a broader sample that might have firms with missing choice variables. We repeated the second stage analysis using the limited sample with no missing choice variable values and got results that are consistent with those reported for the broader sample. The results are available with the authors.
We also compute the median R 2 values for each model in Panel A of Table 7. The medians and the means are not very different, which shows that the distributions of R 2 values are not skewed. The difference in medians tests give essentially the same results as the difference in means tests for R 2 values.
We acknowledge that for inventory policy to be a priced risk factor, the significant loading on INVfactor is a necessary but not sufficient condition, as it just shows that assets co-vary with a portfolio designed to mimic exposure to this inventory policy risk factor. To further examine if FIFO firms command a high risk premium, we investigate LIFO/FIFO choice with the implied cost of capital in an additional test.
For instance, Lamont et al. (2001) show that a financial constraints factor exists, but contrary to expectation, its pricing, using the realized returns remains a puzzle because the financially constrained firms exhibit a negative risk premium.
We are thankful to the reviewer who suggested that we should address the issue of realized returns not being a good proxy for the expected returns.
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Acknowledgments
We are grateful to the reviewer for the suggestions that have greatly improved the paper. This paper has benefited immensely from the comments of the discussant, Per Olsson and other participants at the 2007 RAST conference. We are also grateful to Suresh Radhakrishnan, Robert Halperin and the participants of the workshop at the Hong Kong Polytechnic University for their comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this paper. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support provided by the Hong Kong Polytechnic University Departmental Research Grant.
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Appendices
Appendix: Section 1: Non-discretionary accruals
In this section, we show that the accrual quality (AQ) as defined by McNichols (2002) will be higher for FIFO firms than for LIFO firms under the assumption that the LIFO layers are not used during that year.
We make the following simplifying assumptions:
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1.
The unit cost of purchased inventoriable resources follows a random walk as follows: Unit cost in year t = c t . c t+1 = c t + ɛt+1 where ɛt+1 is distributed with a mean of 0 and a constant variance \(\sigma_\varepsilon^{2}.\) Further, Cov(ɛ t , ɛt±k) = 0 ∀ k ≠ 0. It is easy to see that in this process, conditional variance \(V(c_{t+s}|c_t)=s\sigma_{\varepsilon}^{2}.\)
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2.
The unit price of the final product also follows a similar random walk as follows: Unit price in year t = p t ; p t+1 = p t + u t+1 where u t+1 is distributed with a mean of 0 and a constant variance ψ2. Further, Cov(ψ t , ψt±k) = 0 ∀ k ≠ 0. It is easy to see that in this process, conditional variance V(pt+s|pt) = sψ2.
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3.
We suppress (without loss of generality) fixed production costs if any, and also other variable costs of labor and other non-inventoriable resources. Therefore, the unit gross margin = unit contribution margin = (p t − c t ).
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4.
The operating expenses are all-cash expenses and remain constant from year to year. Further, the sale quantity, the depreciation expense and the property, plant and equipment remain constant.
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5.
Other notations are as follows:
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a.
d ar = (Number of days of accounts receivable)/365
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b.
d ap = (Number of days of accounts payable)/365
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c.
d inv = (Number of days of inventory)/365
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d.
\(\Updelta AR_{t}, \Updelta AP_{t}, \Updelta Inv_{t}\) = changes in accounts receivable, accounts payable and reported inventory costs respectively from the beginning of year t to end of year t. \(\Updelta Inv_{t\,\, LIFO}\) and \(\Updelta Inv_{t\,\, FIFO}\) denote the expected inventory changes under LIFO and FIFO, respectively
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e.
TCA t = Total current accrual for year t. In our simplified setting, it is defined as \((\Updelta AR_{t} + \Updelta Inv_{t} - \Updelta AP_{t}).\)
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a.
1.1 Step 1: Computation of changes in AR, AP and INV
AR t = d ar qp t This gives ΔAR t = [d ar q(p t − pt−1)] = [d ar qu t ].
Similarly, ΔAP t = [d ap q(c t − c t−1)] = [d ap qɛ t ].
The change in inventory under LIFO, without dipping into the LIFO layers = 0 because the same level of physical inventory is expected at the end of both years (t − 1) and t and both the inventories will have the same LIFO layers with identical costs.
Assuming that the number of units taken out of inventory in year t is greater than the number of units in inventory at the end of year t − 1, the reported expected inventory level at the end of year (t − 1) under FIFO = d inv qc t−1. At the end of year t, it is d inv qc t . The change in inventory under FIFO is therefore, d inv q(c t − c t−1) = d inv qɛ t .
1.2 Step 2: Total current accruals
Under LIFO,
Under FIFO,
From the above two expressions,
1.3 Step 3: Operating cash flows
In our setting, the cash flow in year t is the difference between the revenue and replacement cost for resources, less the operating cash expenses, adjusted for changes in accounts receivable and accounts payable. We can also view this as the earnings adjusted for the changes in accruals. The pre-tax earnings are given by
where the subscript j = FIFO,LIFO; qp t is the revenue and \(qc_t -\Updelta Inv_{tj}\) is the cost of goods sold.
We assume that the effective tax rate is τ. Adjusting for the change in accruals, we get the following expressions for cash flow from operations after deducting the tax payments.
For FIFO firms,
Substituting for \(\Updelta Inv_s,\) we get
For LIFO firms,
We can write
1.4 Step 4: Change in Sales
The sales quantity is constant and therefore, the change is sales revenue is purely driven by the change in price.
1.5 Step 5: The McNichols (2002) Accrual Quality Regression and Estimation
In our setting, given that the PPE is assumed to be constant, the regression is:
where j denotes the inventory policy, j = FIFO, LIFO, i denotes the firm and t denotes the year. and ξ it denotes the residual term.
1.6 Step 6: Vector Notation
Let n denote the number of firm-years.
We will express (A3) as Y = XB + S. In particular, for LIFO and FIFO firms, this expression becomes
and
where Y is a n-dimensional vector of the corresponding TCA it values,
B is the vector of estimated β’s:
1.7 Step 7: Proof
We assume cov(ξt, ξs) = 0 s ≠ t
The relationships are
Denoting the second term in (A6) as Z, we have X LIFO = X FIFO + Z
From the regression Eq. A3,
Separately, for FIFO and LIFO firms,
From (A6), we know that Y FIFO = Y LIFO + d inv qΞ
Substituting in (A10), we get
Noting that Cov(ɛ t , ɛ s ) = 0 ∀ s ≠ t,
In expectation,
We note that
In the expression \(B_{FIFO}^{\prime} X_{LIFO}^{\prime} Y_{LIFO}\) in (A13), we use B FIFO to determine the sum of squares. By definition, it is not optimal. Hence the inequality.
Now consider the expression \(B_{FIFO}^{\prime} X_{LIFO}^{\prime} Y_{LIFO}\)
We can write it as
In expectation, expressions (ii) and (iii) in (A14) are zeros because in (ii) Z′ consists of ɛ which do not co-vary with Y FIFO and in (iii), Ξ consists of ɛ which do not co-vary with X. Therefore,
However, we can expand
In expectation, this will reduce to
From (A11),
The expression in [..] is SSE FIFO.
From the expressions A1-FIFO, A2-FIFO and A3-FIFO, we can write
Given that τ < 1 and β2 < 0, SSE LIFO < SSE FIFO
From this inequality, it is clear that the expected variance of the residuals in McNichols (2002) regression using FIFO is higher than the expected variance of the residuals in the regression using LIFO. In other words, the AQ for FIFO firms is expected to be higher than the AQ for LIFO firms.
1.8 Generalization arguments
Most of those assumptions made in the derivation above are meant to simplify the model. However, they do not typically affect the findings. The main assumptions made to simplify the model are (i) constant sales volume; (ii) efficient factor and product markets and (iii) no drift in prices and costs.
Now consider the assumption of constant sales volume. Any increase or decrease in sales quantity in the current year could change the quantity of physical inventory. In so far as this does not necessitate dipping into LIFO layers, all the arguments in the derivation above are valid. If the sales volume is increasing or decreasing, the expected future cash flow and inventory introduce an additional noise but this noise is independent of the additional variance that we have shown in (A17).
If we relax the efficient factor and product markets assumption, we will no longer be able to model the effect using random walk model. However, as long as in expectation, the variability over a longer period is more than the variability over shorter periods for costs, the model yields the correct predictions.
Any drift in costs and prices also does not affect the effect very much because the effect is in the second rather than in the first moment.
Section 2: Discretionary accruals
In this section, we address the decision of a manager acting opportunistically to insert a discretionary accrual amount (that is not likely to get reflected in cash flow) into a financial statement account that is audited. Let the accrual amount be x and the distribution of the account in which he inserts the amount be described by f(y) where y is a random variable representing the amount in the account before the insertion of the accrual. We will assume that f(y) is a normal distribution with mean μ and variance \(\sigma_y^{2}.\) We will also assume, without loss of generality, that overstatement of y is costly and that the auditor will investigate the account if the realized value of y exceeds the expected amount, μ.
The incremental probability of investigation by the auditor, P, after inserting an accrual x in the account is given by the following expression:
where N(·) denotes the cumulative normal distribution.
We will evaluate P using Taylor’s series for the first three terms around x = 0 (which also implies y = μ).
where P(0, σ y ), P′(0, σ y ) and P′′(0, σ y ) are the function, the first and the second derivatives evaluated at x = 0.
It is easy to see that \(P(0,\sigma_y) =0, P^{\prime} (0, \sigma_y) = (\frac{1}{\sigma_y \sqrt{2\pi}})\) and P′′ (0, σ y ) = 0
This gives
Differentiating P with σ y , we get:
The above result shows that the incremental probability of investigation resulting from the insertion of the accrual into an asset account is reduced when the standard deviation of the account is high. In Sect. 1 of the appendix, we showed that the standard deviation of the cost of goods using FIFO is higher than that using LIFO. Therefore, inserting the accrual into a FIFO account is less likely to trigger an investigation by the auditor into the veracity of the accrual than when it is inserted into a similar LIFO account. If the manager is acting opportunistically and wants to reduce the probability of investigation, it is more likely that discretionary accruals are embedded in the FIFO account than in the LIFO account.
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Krishnan, G.V., Srinidhi, B. & Su, L.(. Inventory policy, accruals quality and information risk. Rev Acc Stud 13, 369–410 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-008-9067-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-008-9067-2