Abstract
This article attempts to expand the scope of the project of global justice on one parameter but to circumscribe that project on three other parameters. It is argued that the difference of level of application as between individuals and collectives should be transcended in a ‘collective turn’. But this inclusiveness must be accompanied by an insistence on the distinction between a generic or intrinsic understanding of vulnerability on the one hand, and a contingent understanding of vulnerability on the other. Another distinction that must be observed is that between private and public entities. On both dimensions the latter option is to be preferred. Only the contingent vulnerabilities of public entities are of relevance to a practical program of global justice. It is also suggested that formal distinctions in entitlements should be observed. Hohfeld’s scheme is called upon in order to distinguish between claim-rights and immunities and to advocate for the latter as better reflecting the desiderata of global justice. Frequently presupposed connections between vulnerability and rights are thus brought into question. Finally, the proposed framework for global justice enables a novel articulation with, and an illumination of, the demands of equality. For that which is private in a legal sense is constituted by the clash of wills of individual legal persons. Public interests are always shared, thus connoting spheres of equality; understood in this way equality is the stuff of global justice.
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Notes
As observed by Weis (2015, p. 235).
The adoption by the G20 in 2008 of a macroeconomic perspective has been described as ‘encompassing the world economy as a whole … The change in perspective is comparable to that of the emergence of global environmental law or the human rights debate:’ Lehmann (2017, p. 409).
Miller (2013, p. 174).
Ibid 3; impracticality is a related, important ground on which to disqualify candidate theories of distributive justice: Tasioulas (2005, p. 10).
Miller (2013, p. 175).
Ibid 165.
Rawls (1999a).
Nussbaum (2006, p. 92).
This paper does not enter the cognate debates on the extension of justice to non-human animals or to objects conventionally thought of as inanimate such as rivers and mountains.
Waldron (2017, p. 130).
Ibid 84. ‘Range’ can be analogised with the geographical boundaries of a province within which, say, two cities are of equal status as such even if one is central and the other peripheral. Usage above is also analogical. Note that the Rule of Law as usually understood, expresses a somewhat similar view of equality within boundaries or classes.
Golder (2016, p. 684).
Ibid.
Sen (2009, p. 5).
Sen further argues that ‘[i]f a theory of justice is to guide reasoned choices of policies, strategies or institutions, then the identification of fully just social arrangements is neither necessary nor sufficient’: ibid, 15.
Sandel (2010, p. 261).
Howse and Teitel (2010, p. 439).
Nussbaum, ibid, 231 and Rawls, ibid 103.
This approach might be thought of as cognate with a ‘pragmatic’ approach to human rights: Golder (2016, p. 685). The suggestion by Nagel that human institutions may have to pass through a phase of injustice on their way to justice might be thought of as a radical version of the responsive approach to global justice: Nagel (2005, p. 145).
Kurasawa (2007, p. 200).
Skogly (2010, pp. 71, 96).
Ibid 96.
Kinley and Tadaki (2004, p. 935).
Valentini (2017).
Bentham (1987, p. 49).
It should be noted that the Hohfeldian analysis of claim-rights and other basic legal relationships, an analysis that owes much to Bentham, is to be called upon at a later stage of the argument at a point when definitional precision of a formal kind will be required.
A stronger claim that all human rights are collective rights is thus adumbrated but will not be pursued here. This proposal would now, in the light of discussions below, in any case need reconsideration to the extent that a more precise Hohfeldian terminology is to be preferred.
On the community-scale effects of international law, see Eslava (2015).
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976).
Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act (Vic) 2006.
Kinley (2009, p. 33).
Koskenniemi (2010).
Endicott (2006, p. 358).
Gardner (2017).
Waldron (2012).
Endicott (2010, p. 181).
Fischer-Lescano (2012, p. 7).
‘[The] so-called rights of man, as distinct from the rights of the citizen, are simply the rights … of egoistic man, of man separated from other men and from the community’: Karl Marx, cited by Knox (2016, p. 310) (emphasis in original).
It has been observed in the context of a cosmopolitan approach to toleration that ‘[t]he world is vulnerable to excessive intervention’: Tan (2005, p. 707).
Charter of the United Nations art 51.
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990).
Bhatia (2015, p. 10).
Rawls (1999b, p. 103).
Junker-Kenny (2014, p. 295).
Fineman (2008–9, p. 8).
Venturi (2017, p. 192).
Nussbaum (2006, p. 92).
Humans were understood as ‘equal, not least in their weakness:’ Siedentop (2014, p. 301).
Waldron (2017, p. 139).
Ibid 97.
Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, cited by Ronge (2017, p. 287).
Adam Smith ibid.
Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, cited by Ronge, ibid 300.
Rawls (1999b, p. 110).
Ibid 17.
Ibid 331.
Rawls (1999b, p. 83).
Macmillan (2011, p. 194).
Tuck (1979, p. 173).
Ryan (2012, p. 476).
Tuck (1979, p. 172).
Property as natural right in this iconic sense was a well developed idea much earlier than Locke; as expressed early in the sixteenth century by Thomas More ‘every man has, by the law of nature, a right to such a waste portion of the earth as is necessary for his subsistence:’ More (2016, p. 87).
Ryan (2012, p. 479).
Ibid 481.
Frankopan (2015, p. 191).
Thus, ‘[g]lobal financial regulation is not about individual institutions or national markets as such; rather, it deals only with those factors that pertain to the functioning of the global market. More specifically, its aim is to guarantee worldwide financial stability and prevent systemic risk’ (Lehmann 2017, p. 408).
Katz (2011, p. 120).
Ibid; emphasis in original.
Hertzberg v Finland No. 14/61 U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts Comm., 37th Session, Supp. No 40, at 161, U.N. Doc. No. A/37/40 (1982).
Newcrest Mining (WA) Limited and BHP Minerals Limited v Commonwealth of Australian and Director of National Parks and Wildlife (1997) 190 CLR 513, 660 per Kirby J; the assertion is in any event obiter since the ratio of the decision (to allow the appeal) comprises, as Kirby J acknowledges at 661, the opinion shared by the majority on the effect of the National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act 1975 (Cwth) in the light of s 51(xxxi) Australian Constitution. See Brazil (1997, p. 185).
To assert that fair dealing by public bodies with private companies must be consistent with the Australian Constitution is not controversial. However that Constitution does not contain a Bill of Rights.
Kinley and Tadaki (2004, p. 1009).
McBeth (2010, p. 155).
Morss and Bagaric (2005).
Ratner (2001, p. 514).
Ibid 542.
Ibid 514.
Ibid.
The United Nations might be considered a playing field of the same ‘Vattelian’ species in that formal equality of member states is accompanied by massive differentials of population, wealth and military or economic power.
As Backer observes, governance in the contemporary world no longer looks to the traditional territorial state as paradigm. The organisation of governance ‘does not require a territory from which to project governance power beyond territorial boundaries…. [G]lobalisation has made it possible to develop governance spaces outside of both states and public international organisations:’ Backer (2012, p. 88). Also see Backer (2017).
Kramer et al. (1998, p. 20).
Ibid.
Ibid 21.
Gray (2008, p. 33).
Theodore Roosevelt’s ‘Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine’, further developed by Woodrow Wilson, purported to legitimate ‘the exercise of an international police power’ in response to ‘chronic wrongdoing’ in foreign states: Ferguson (2004, p. 52).
The formula is thus applied with more precision than earlier in this paper. Within the present scheme unlike that of Waldron, those entities that enjoy equality with each other are not exclusively or even predominantly individual natural persons. On a cognate approach, see the discussion by Harris (2004, p. 434) of what he terms ‘domain rights’.
The Will Theory and the Interest Theory are competing accounts of rights so that a mapping of the former onto Hohfeld’s first (private) order, and the second onto his second (public) order, would be conceptual monstrosity of Piltdown Man proportions. However the enlivening of the relationships between wills and interests might not be entirely devoid of value.
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Acknowledgements
My grateful thanks to the following for generous commentary and other support and encouragement with this project: Helmut P. Aust; Larry Catá Backer; Michelle Bendall; Matt Lister; Karen Powell; Prabhakar Singh; David Tan. Howlers I sequester.
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Morss, J.R. Cutting Global Justice Down to Size? Rights, Vulnerabilities, Immunities, Communities. Liverpool Law Rev 40, 179–202 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10991-019-09231-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10991-019-09231-1