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Off-line digital cash schemes providing untraceability, anonymity and change

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Abstract

Several ecash systems have been proposed in the last twenty years or so, each offering features similar to real cash. One feature which to date has not been provided is that of a payee giving change to a payer for an e-coin in an off-line setting. In this paper, we indicate how an off-line ecash system can solve the change-giving problem. In addition, our protocol offers the usual expected features of anonymity and unlinkability of the payer, but can reveal the identity of an individual who illegally tries to spend ecash twice.

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Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Professor Yuliang Zheng for his valuable comments on the double discrete logarithm problem and Ms. Kalpana Singh for her comments on parts of earlier versions of this paper, and for her assistance in assembling Table 2.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Information Technology, Deakin University, Geelong, VIC, Australia

    Lynn Batten

  2. School of Computer Science and Software Engineering, RMIT University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

    Xun Yi

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  1. Lynn Batten
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Correspondence to Lynn Batten.

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Batten, L., Yi, X. Off-line digital cash schemes providing untraceability, anonymity and change. Electron Commer Res 19, 81–110 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10660-018-9289-8

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