Skip to main content

Advertisement

Log in

Professional Accountancy Organizations and Stock Market Development

  • Original Paper
  • Published:
Journal of Business Ethics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This study investigates the relationship between the ethical, educational, and disciplinary development of professional accountancy organizations (PAOs) in a given country and the development of that country’s stock market. Using a comprehensive measure based on the responses of the major PAOs in 36 countries to a questionnaire designed by the International Federation of Accountants to assess the development of PAOs internationally, we find a significantly positive association between the development of PAOs and stock market development. In addition, we find the positive association between the development of PAOs and stock market development to be more pronounced in countries with higher levels of investor protection, a stronger public enforcement environment, or lower levels of corruption, suggesting the importance of complementary institutions in the relationship between PAOs and stock market development. We also find that better-developed PAOs are associated with better-quality financial reporting. Finally, our result also shows that relative to the investigation and discipline mechanism and educational requirements imposed by PAOs, the ethical development of a country’s professional accountants appears to have the strongest positive association with a country’s stock market development.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. This definition of the profession was provided by the Australian Council of Professions in 1995 (also see http://www.psc.gov.au/what-is-a-profession).

  2. For example, the UNCTAD-ISAR (The Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on International Standards of Accounting and Reporting of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) stated, “Accounting plays an essential role in economic development. High-quality corporate reporting is key to improving transparency, facilitating the mobilization of domestic and international investment, creating sound investment environments and fostering investor confidence, thus promoting financial stability.” See http://www.accaglobal.com/content/dam/acca/global/PDF-technical/global-economy/pol-tp-raed.pdf.

  3. See Appendix 1 for a comprehensive list of the major PAOs of each country in our sample.

  4. For each country, we create two overall measures of PAOs (i.e., one based on the answers to six general questions, PAO_general, and the other based on the answers to 25 more specific questions, PAO_specific) designed to assess the level of development of each PAO member of IFAC. In addition, we create three additional PAO measures for the three major dimensions of each PAO: (1) requirements for ethics (PAO_Ethics), (2) requirements for education (PAO_Education), and (3) level of investigation and discipline (PAO_Oversight). See Appendix 2 for further details on the definitions of these measures.

  5. Analogous to the conclusion of our study, Joseph Stalin’s famous statement in 1923, “It doesn’t matter how the votes are cast, but how they’re counted,” suggests that the ethics of political practitioners play an important role in the development of a country’s political system.

  6. IFAC states, “When professional accountancy organizations (PAOs) function properly, they have the power to support the production of high-quality information, contributing to public and private sector, economic growth, and the effectiveness of international aid.” Other studies show that higher quality financial reporting and a better information environment contribute to a lower cost of capital, higher liquidity, more efficient corporate investment, and better-functioning capital markets, ultimately leading to a better-developed stock market (La Porta et al. 1998; Bushman and Smith 2001; Healy and Palepu 2001; Frost et al. 2006; Hail and Leuz 2006; Hope and Thomas 2008; Biddle et al. 2009).

  7. https://www.ifac.org/about-ifac/accountancy-profession-playing-positive-role-fighting-corruption.

  8. In this study, we do not specifically differentiate between accountants and auditors because the ultimate natures of their roles in financial markets are similar—to provide credible and useful financial information to both internal and external users of financial reporting.

  9. For example, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) defines financial accounting as “the art of recording, classifying and summarizing in a significant manner and in terms of money, transactions and events which are, in part at least, of a financial character, and interpreting the results thereof.” This definition of financial accounting was formulated in 1941 by the AICPA Committee on Accounting Procedures.

  10. See also “The accountancy profession’s role in creating public value” by ACCA (http://www.accaglobal.com/content/dam/acca/global/pdf/public-value-report.pdf).

  11. Consistent with our argument, Demerjian et al. (2013) show that managers who are more knowledgeable about their business and their operating environment tend to make better judgments and estimates, and they thus have positive effects on firms’ financial reporting quality.

  12. These costs include the risk of losing higher compensation and jeopardizing career development, individual reputation, and social status.

  13. In line with this view, several studies report a higher level of auditor litigation risk to be positively associated with better audit quality (Khurana and Raman 2004; Venkataraman et al. 2008).

  14. PAOs that are not recognized as substantial national organizations can only be admitted as associates rather than formal members. The associates of IFAC are not required to complete the self-assessment questionnaire used to establish PAOs development score by our study. More information about IFAC’s membership admission criteria and process can be found at https://www.ifac.org/system/files/uploads/CAP/IFAC-Membership-Admission-Criteria-and-Process.pdf.

  15. The full survey comprises three major parts: Part I, whose aim is to obtain an understanding of the country’s regulatory framework; Part 2, which is a self-assessment questionnaire concerning the status quo institutions established or maintained by the PAO (we use this part to construct our PAO measure); and Part 3, which covers action plans demonstrating the progress the PAO has made in fulfilling its membership obligations and how it plans to do so in the future. We use a subset of questions in the self-assessment questionnaire that can be unambiguously quantified to construct the measures of PAOs.

  16. Correlation analysis indicates a significant positive association between the score of each PAO in countries with multiple PAOs.

  17. While not all of the PAOs in our sample countries are affiliated with IFAC, the non-IFAC affiliated PAOs mainly operate like specialist bodies helping the work of accountants and auditors in specific fields such as taxation, forensic auditing, and systems auditing or for networking purposes. We conduct a search for each country included in our sample. Consistent with the specialized nature of these non-IFAC affiliated PAOs, we are only able to identify a few, such as The Association of International Accountants (AIA) and the Consultative Committee of Accountancy Bodies (CCAB) in the U.K., the National Association of State Boards of Accountancy (NASBA) and the Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) in the U.S., and the Hong Kong Business Accountants Association (HKBAA) and the Society of Chinese Accountants and Auditors (SCAA) in Hong Kong.

  18. We perform additional analyses on an earlier sample period, 2000–2006, instead of 2007–2012. Our conclusions are unchanged.

  19. The aggregate earnings management score from Leuz et al. (2003) is the average rank of two earnings-smoothing measures and two earnings-discretion measures, including the magnitude of accruals and small loss avoidance. Our results indicate that the positive association between the development of PAOs and the aggregate earnings management score measure introduced by Leuz et al. (2003) is mainly driven by the two earnings-smoothing measures. We find no significant relationship between the development of PAOs and any of the two earnings-discretion measures. As a result, we use the altered form of earnings quality measure developed by Leuz et al. (2003) and report only the results based on the two earnings-smoothing measures.

  20. Frost et al. (2006) also measure the extensiveness of disclosure rules for each stock exchange. Our main results are qualitatively the same if we use stock exchange disclosure rules rather than the enforcement of those rules as a control.

  21. As PAO_specific is the mean value of three components of development of PAOs that are available only in the partial sample, we can only examine its effect in the partial sample.

  22. In our model, we follow Frost et al. (2006) in choosing country-level institutional variables to include for model validation and better comparison. However, it is also possible that other country characteristics that are likely to be correlated with the development of PAOs but are not included in the model may drive the results of PAOs on stock market development and accounting quality. To reduce such concern, we further include in our model several time-varying country-level controls including GDP per capita, a variable measuring the openness of a country (i.e., international trade as a percentage of GDP), and inflation. Data on GDP per capita and openness are obtained from IMD World Competitiveness Database and the data on inflation is obtained from the World Bank. We thank our reviewers for making this suggestion.

  23. Moreover, to better distinguish between the rule of law and investor protection strength in a given country, we repeat our test by separating our overall LEGPRO variable into one variable that is more related to the rule of law (calculated as the mean of RL_F, FL_H, and RL_W) and another that is more related to investor protection (calculated as the mean of IP, SR, MIP_G, and IP_G). We find that our results are robust to this test model. Finally, the results remain robust to the exclusion of 2007 and 2008, the years in which the financial crisis occurred.

  24. Conducting a similar test on firm-year-level data does not change our conclusion.

  25. In an additional test, we also interact the development of PAOs with an aggregated earning smoothing measure to examine whether the relationship between PAOs and stock market development varies with firms’ earnings management. We find a significant and negative coefficient on the interaction term. This finding indicates that PAOs’ effect on stock market development is stronger in countries with lower earnings management.

  26. The results are similar when the OLS regression model is used.

  27. Although the average likelihood of restatement appears to be very high in Table 2, a more careful examination indicates that it is mainly driven by the restatement of firms in relatively small countries and firms with small firm size. For example, for both US and Canada, the average likelihood of restatement for firms in each of these two countries in our sample is about 11 %. This average appears to be reasonable given the fact that Capital IQ Compustat tends to have higher firm coverage and thus more small firms are included. Because firms with small size may be more likely to restate their financial information for multiple years during our sample period, in robustness test, we restrict our restatement sample to those firms with restatement for the very first time during our sample period and find our inference unaltered.

  28. We directly test the significance of the differences between (1) the estimated coefficient for PAO_Ethics and that for PAO_Education, and (2) the estimated coefficient for PAO_Ethics and that for PAO_Oversight. In both tests, we find that PAO_Ethics has a statistically higher association with MARKDEV than PAO_Education and PAO_Oversight.

References

  • Ardelean, A. (2013). Auditors’ ethics and their impact on public trust. Procedia—Social and Behavioral Sciences, 92, 55–60.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ball, R., Kothari, S. P., & Robin, A. (2000). The effect of international institutional factors on properties of accounting earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 29(1), 1–51.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ball, R., Robin, A., & Wu, J. S. (2003). Incentives versus standards: Properties of accounting income in four East Asian countries. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 36(1), 235–270.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bekaert, G., Harvey, C. R., & Lundblad, C. (2005). Does financial liberalization spur growth? Journal of Financial Economics, 77(1), 3–55.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bhattacharya, U., & Daouk, H. (2002). The world price of insider trading. The Journal of Finance, 57(1), 75–108.

    Google Scholar 

  • Biddle, G. C., Hilary, G., & Verdi, R. S. (2009). How does financial reporting quality relate to investment efficiency? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 48(2), 112–131.

    Google Scholar 

  • Black, B. S. (2001). The legal and institutional preconditions for strong securities markets. UCLA Law Review, 48, 781–856.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bushman, R. M., & Smith, A. J. (2001). Financial accounting information and corporate governance. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 32(1), 237–333.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cao, Y., Myers, L. A., Tsang, A., & Yang, Y. G. (2017). Management forecasts and the cost of equity capital: International evidence. Review of Accounting Studies, 22(2), 791–838.

    Google Scholar 

  • Choi, J. H., & Wong, T. J. (2007). Auditors’ governance functions and legal environments: An international investigation. Contemporary Accounting Research, 24(1), 13–46.

    Google Scholar 

  • Daske, H., Hail, L., Leuz, C., & Verdi, R. (2008). Mandatory IFRS reporting around the world: Early evidence on the economic consequences. Journal of Accounting Research, 46(5), 1084–1142.

    Google Scholar 

  • Daske, H., Hail, L., Leuz, C., & Verdi, R. (2013). Adopting a label: Heterogeneity in the economic consequences around IAS/IFRS adoptions. Journal of Accounting Research, 51(3), 495–547.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dechow, P., Ge, W., & Schrand, C. (2010). Understanding earnings quality: A review of the proxies, their determinants and their consequences. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50(2), 344–401.

    Google Scholar 

  • DeFond, M., Hung, M., & Trezevant, R. (2007). Investor protection and the information content of annual earnings announcements: International evidence. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 43(1), 37–67.

    Google Scholar 

  • Demerjian, P. R., Lev, B., Lewis, M. F., & McVay, S. E. (2013). Managerial ability and earnings quality. The Accounting Review, 88(2), 463–498.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dhaliwal, D. S., Radhakrishnan, S., Tsang, A., & Yang, Y. G. (2012). Nonfinancial disclosure and analyst forecast accuracy: International evidence on corporate social responsibility disclosure. The Accounting Review, 87(3), 723–759.

    Google Scholar 

  • Durnev, A., & Kim, E. (2005). To steal or not to steal: Firm attributes, legal environment, and valuation. Journal of Finance, 60(3), 1461–1493.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fan, J. P., & Wong, T. J. (2002). Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earnings in East Asia. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33(3), 401–425.

    Google Scholar 

  • Francis, J. R., Michas, P. N., & Seavey, S. E. (2013). Does audit market concentration harm the quality of audited earnings? Evidence from audit markets in 42 countries. Contemporary Accounting Research, 30(1), 325–355.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frost, C. A., Gordon, E. A., & Hayes, A. F. (2006). Stock exchange disclosure and market development: An analysis of 50 international exchanges. Journal of Accounting Research, 44(3), 437–483.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hail, L., & Leuz, C. (2006). International differences in the cost of equity capital: Do legal institutions and securities regulation matter? Journal of Accounting Research, 44(3), 485–531.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hanushek, E. A., & Kimko, D. D. (2000). Schooling, labor-force quality, and the growth of nations. American Economic Review, 90(5), 1184–1208.

    Google Scholar 

  • Healy, P. M., & Palepu, K. G. (2001). Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 31(1), 405–440.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hennes, K. M., Leone, A. J., & Miller, B. P. (2008). The importance of distinguishing errors from irregularities in restatement research: The case of restatements and CEO/CFO turnover. The Accounting Review, 83(6), 1487–1519.

    Google Scholar 

  • Holthausen, R. W. (2009). Accounting standards, financial reporting outcomes and enforcement. Journal of Accounting Research, 47(2), 447–458.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hope, O. K., & Thomas, W. B. (2008). Managerial empire building and firm disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research, 46(3), 591–626.

    Google Scholar 

  • Isidro, H., Nanda, D., & Wysocki, P. (2016). Financial reporting differences around the world: What matters? Working Paper, University of Miami.

  • Jackson, H. W., & Roe, M. J. (2009). Public and private enforcement of securities laws: Resource-based evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 93(2), 207–238.

    Google Scholar 

  • Khurana, I. K., & Raman, K. K. (2004). Litigation risk and the financial reporting credibility of Big 4 versus non-Big 4 audits: Evidence from Anglo-American countries. The Accounting Review, 79(2), 473–495.

    Google Scholar 

  • La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2006). What works in securities laws? The Journal of Finance, 61(1), 1–32.

    Google Scholar 

  • La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). Legal determinants of external finance. Journal of Finance, 52(3), 1131–1150.

    Google Scholar 

  • La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998). Law and finance. Journal of Political Economy, 106(6), 1113–1155.

    Google Scholar 

  • La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (2000). Investor protection and corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1), 3–27.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lang, M., Lins, K. V., & Maffett, M. (2012). Transparency, liquidity, and valuation: International evidence on when transparency matters most. Journal of Accounting Research, 50(3), 729–774.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leuz, C., Nanda, D., & Wysocki, P. D. (2003). Earnings management and investor protection: An international comparison. Journal of Financial Economics, 69(3), 505–527.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levine, R. (1997). Financial development and economic growth: Views and agenda. Journal of Economic Literature, 35(2), 688–726.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levine, R. (2002). Napoleon, bourses, and growth: With a focus on Latin America. In O. Azfar & C. Cadwell (Eds.), Market augmenting government: The institutional foundations for prosperity (pp. 49–85). Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, Wantage.

    Google Scholar 

  • Li, S. (2010). Does mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards in the European Union reduce the cost of equity capital? The Accounting Review, 85(2), 607–636.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mellahi, K., & Wood, G. (2002). The ethical business. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

    Google Scholar 

  • Michas, P. N. (2011). The importance of audit profession development in emerging market countries. The Accounting Review, 86(5), 1731–1764.

    Google Scholar 

  • Milbourn, T. T. (2003). CEO reputation and stock-based compensation. Journal of Financial Economics, 68(2), 233–262.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pevzner, M., Xie, F., & Xin, X. (2013). When firms talk, do investors listen? The role of trust in stock market reactions to corporate earnings announcements. Journal of Financial Economics, 117(1), 190–223.

    Google Scholar 

  • Plumlee, M., & Yohn, T. L. (2010). An analysis of the underlying causes attributed to restatements. The Accounting Horizons, 24(1), 41–64.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rezaee, Z. (2004). Restoring public trust in the accounting profession by developing anti-fraud education, programs, and auditing. Managerial Auditing Journal, 19(1), 134–148.

    Google Scholar 

  • Venkataraman, R., Weber, J. P., & Willenborg, M. (2008). Litigation risk, audit quality, and audit fees: Evidence from initial public offerings. The Accounting Review, 83(5), 1315–1345.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

We appreciate the valuable comments from Steven Dellaportas (editor) and two anonymous referees, and the seminar/conference participants at The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Baptist University, Australia National University, Canadian Academic Accounting Association (CAAA) Annual Meeting 2016 Annual Conference, and 4th Joint International Conference of the Journal of International Accounting Research (JIAR) and Accounting, Organizations and Society (AOS) 2016 conference. We also thank international Federation of Accountants (IFAC) for providing the IFAC members survey data for our analysis. Xiangting Kong acknowledges the financial support of The National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Numbers: 71272196; 71572206), the Major Project of Guangdong Humanities and Social Sciences Key Research Foundation (Grant Number: 2012JDXM-0002), and The Basic Research Foundation for Assistant Professors of Sun Yat-Sen University (Grant Number: 16wkpy04).

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Albert Tsang.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Professional Accountancy Organizations in the Sample Countries

 

Country

Professional accountancy organizations (PAOs)

 

1

Argentina

Federación Argentina de Consejos Profesionales de Ciencias Económicas

1*

2

Australia

CPA Australia

 
 

Australia

Institute of Public Accountants

 
 

Australia

The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia

 

3

Austria

Kammer der Wirtschaftstreuhänder

 

4

Belgium

Institut des Réviseurs d’Entreprises

2*

 

Belgium

Institut des Experts-comptables et des Conseils Fiscaux—Instituut Van de Accountants en de Belastingconsulenten (IEC-IAB)

 

5

Brazil

Conselho Federal de Contabilidade (CFC)

 

6

Canada

The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants

3*

 

Canada

Certified General Accountants Association of Canada

 
 

Canada

Certified Management Accountants of Canada

 

7

Chile

Colegio de Contadores de Chile

 

8

Denmark

FSR—danske revisorer

 

9

Finland

HTM-tilintarkastajat—GRM—revisorer ry

4*

10

France

Conseil Supérieur de l’Ordre des Experts-Comptables

5*

11

Germany

Wirtschaftsprüferkammer (WPK)

6*

12

Greece

Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Greece (SOEL)

7*

13

Hong Kong

Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants

 

14

Indonesia

Indonesian Institute of Accountants or Ikatan Akuntan Indonesia (IAI)

 

15

Ireland

The Institute of Certified Public Accountants in Ireland

8*

 

Ireland

Chartered Accountants Ireland

 
 

Ireland

Accounting Technicians Ireland

 

16

Israel

Institute of Certified Public Accountants in Israel

 

17

Italy

Consiglio Nazionale dei Dottori Commercialisti e degli Esperti Contabili

9*

18

Japan

The Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants

10*

19

Luxembourg

Ordre des Experts-Comptables du Luxembourg

11*

 

Luxembourg

Institut des Réviseurs d’Entreprises

 

20

Malaysia

The Malaysian Institute of Certified Public Accountants

12*

 

Malaysia

Malaysian Institute of Accountants

 

21

Mexico

Instituto Mexicano de Contadores Públicos, A.C.

 

22

Netherlands

Koninklijk Nederlands Instituut van Registeraccountants (Royal NIVRA)

 

23

New Zealand

New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants

 

24

Norway

Den Norske Revisorforening (DnR)

 

25

Philippines

Philippine Institute of Certified Public Accountants

 

26

Poland

National Chamber of Statutory Auditors

13*

27

Singapore

Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Singapore

 

28

South Africa

The South African Institute of Professional Accountants

14*

29

South Korea

Korean Institute of Certified Public Accountants

15*

30

Spain

Instituto de Censores Jurados de Cuentas de España

 

31

Sweden

Far

 

32

Switzerland

Treuhand-Kammer—Swiss Institute of Certified Accountants and Tax Consultants

16*

33

Taiwan

Federation of CPA Associations of Chinese Taiwan

 

34

Thailand

Federation of Accounting Professions

 

35

UK

Association of Accounting Technicians (AAT)

17*

 

UK

The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland

 
 

UK

The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales

 
 

UK

The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants

 
 

UK

Institute of Financial Accountants

 
 

UK

The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy

 
 

UK

The Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA)

 

36

USA

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)

18*

This appendix presents the full list of the IFAC’s PAO members for all 36 countries in our sample. The information is provided by IFAC. * Indicates countries with no missing values for the PAOs’ measures in our study. The 18 countries so marked constitute our partial sample, and all 36 countries form the full sample.

Appendix 2: Measures of PAOs’ Development

We construct country-level Professional Accountancy Organization (PAO) measures based on IFAC members’ responses to the Assessment of the Regulatory and Standard-Setting Framework Questionnaire prepared by IFAC. All of IFAC’s members are required to complete this questionnaire, which is included in the Statements of Membership Obligations (SMOs). IFAC designed this assessment questionnaire to collect information on the financial reporting and auditing regulatory and standard-setting framework in each PAO’s jurisdiction and on the professional accountants represented by the organization. More specifically, the PAO measures are constructed on the basis of the following dimensions and information.

Overall Measures of PAOs

PAO_general is the average score of all six general questions (PAO_general (1) to PAO_general (6)), data on which are available for all 36 sample countries.

PAO_specific is the average score of all specific questions (questions about PAOs’ oversights (ID1ID8), questions about PAOs’ educational requirements (ED1ED11), and question about PAOs’ ethical requirements (ET1ET6)), data on which are available for 18 of the sample countries.

We further separate the overall PAO_specific measure into its three components to investigate the effect of each:

(1) Requirements for investigation and discipline (PAO_Oversight): the average score of all eight specific questions on the requirements for investigation and discipline mechanisms (ID1ID8).

(2) Requirements for education (PAO_Education): the average score of all 11 specific questions on the requirements for the education of professional accountants (ED1ED11).

(3) Requirements for ethics (PAO_Ethics): the average score of all six specific questions on the ethical requirements for professional accountants (ET1ET6).

(A) Levels of investigation and discipline (ID)

Source: A self-assessment questionnaire for IFAC member bodies on their compliance with IFAC Statements of Membership Obligations 6 (SMO 6).

Description: A measure of the compliance of each country’s PAOs with IFAC requirements on mechanisms for investigating and disciplining (ID) professionals who fail to exercise and maintain professional standards and the related obligations. Each part of the questionnaire contains (1) general questions and (2) more specific questions related to the general questions. The possible scores for each question range from 0 to 1.

 

Variable

Score

General question (1)

(1) Is there a program for investigating and disciplining members of the organization for misconduct, including breaches of professional standards and rules?

PAO_general (1)

0/1

Specific questions (ID1–ID8)

(1) Are there established provisions and processes for investigating and disciplining?

(ID1)

0/1

(2) Which of the following sanctions can be imposed? (A) Reprimand; (B) Loss or restriction of practice rights; (C) Fine/payment of costs; (D) Loss of professional title (designation); (E) Exclusion from membership; (F) Other. (According to the relative severity of the above sanctions, answers (D) or (E) or both score 1; answers including (B) but not (D) or (E) score 2/3; answers including (C) but not (B), (D), or (E) score 1/3; and answers only including (A) or (F) score 0.)

(ID2)

01

(3) Does the organization make members fully aware of all of the provisions of the ethical code and other applicable professional standards and requirements and the consequences of non-compliance?

(ID3)

0/1

(4) Is the organization obligated under local laws to report possible involvement in serious crimes and offenses by members to the appropriate public authority and to disclose related information to it?

(ID4)

0/1

(5) Does the organization have all of the necessary powers for authorized personnel to carry out an effective investigation?

(ID5)

0/1

(6) Does the organization maintain appropriate expertise and adequate financial and other resources to enable timely investigative and disciplinary action?

(ID6)

0/1

(7) Does the organization confirm at the start of the investigation that any individual chosen to assist in an investigation is independent?

(ID7)

0/1

(8) Does the tribunal responsible for the disciplinary hearing include a balance of professional expertise and outside judgment (e.g., a mix of accountants and non-accountants)?

(ID8)

0/1

(B) Educational requirements for professional accountants (ED)

Source: A self-assessment questionnaire for IFAC member bodies concerning their compliance with IFAC Statements of Membership Obligations 2 (SMO 2).

Description: A measure of the compliance of each country’s PAOs with international standards and other pronouncements issued by the International Accounting Education Standards Board (IAESB), an independent standard-setting body supported by IFAC. Each part of the questionnaire contains (1) general questions and (2) more specific questions related to the general questions. Possible scores for each question range from 0 to 1.

 

Variable

Score

General questions (2–5)

(2) Does the organization require individuals admitted as members to complete a professional accountancy education program?

PAO_general (2)

0/1

(3) Does the organization require individuals admitted as members to complete a practical experience requirement?

PAO_general (3)

0/1

(4) Does the organization require individuals admitted as members to complete a final assessment of professional capabilities?

PAO_general (4)

0/1

(5) Is there a requirement for members to maintain competence through continuous professional development (CPD)?

PAO_general (5)

0/1

Specific questions (ED1–ED11)

(1) Does the education program have entry requirements that are at least equivalent to those for admission into a recognized university degree program?

(ED1)

0/1

(2) What is the length of the professional accountancy education? (A) less than two years; (B) two years; or (C) more than two years. (Answer (A) scores 0; answer (B) scores 1/2; answer (C) scores 1.)

(ED2)

01

(3) Which accounting and finance subjects are required in professional accountancy education? (A) Financial accounting; (B) Management accounting; (C) Control; (D) Taxation and financial management; (E) Business and commercial law; (F) Audit and assurance; (G) Finance (H) Professional values and ethics; or (I) None of the above. (Answers including all eight subjects score 1; answers including seven of the eight subjects score 7/8; answers including six of the eight subjects score 6/8, and so on; answer (I) scores 0.)

(ED3)

01

(4) Which organizational and business subjects are required in professional accountancy education? (A) Economics; (B) Business environment; (C) Corporate; (D) Business ethics; (E) Financial markets; (F) Quantitative methods; (G) Organizational governance behavior; (H) Management and strategic decision making; (I) Marketing; (J) International business and globalization; or (K) None of the above. (Answers including all ten subjects score 1; answers including nine of the ten subjects score 9/10; answers including eight of the ten subjects score 8/10, and so on; answer (K) scores 0.)

(ED4)

01

(5) Does professional accountancy education cover values, ethics and attitudes?

(ED5)

0/1

(6) Is practical experience required with approved employers?

(ED6)

0/1

(7) What is the required length of practical experience? (A) less than three years; (B) three years; or (C) more than three years. (Answer (A) scores 0; answer (B) scores 1/2; answer (C) scores 1.)

(ED7)

01

(8) Is the period of practical experience monitored?

(ED8)

0/1

(9) Does the organization require members to complete a final assessment of an individual’s professional capabilities?

(ED9)

0/1

(10) Is there a process to monitor whether professional accountants meet the CPD requirements?

(ED10)

0/1

(11) Are sanctions such as expulsion or denial of the right to practice imposed when professional accountants do not meet CPD requirements?

(ED11)

0/1

(C) Ethical requirements for professional accountants (ET)

Source: A self-assessment questionnaire for IFAC member bodies regarding their compliance with IFAC Statements of Membership Obligations 4 (SMO 4).

Description: Measures of the compliance of each country’s PAOs with the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants issued by the International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants (IESBA), an independent standard-setting body supported by IFAC. Each part of the questionnaire contains (1) general questions and (2) more specific questions related to the general questions. Possible scores for each question range from 0 to 1.

 

Variable

Score

General question (6)

Are there established ethical requirements for members?

PAO_general (6)

0/1

Specific questions (ET1–ET6)

(1) Do the ethical requirements require professional accountants to comply with the fundamental principle of “integrity” as described in the IFAC Code?

(ET1)

0/1

(2) Do the ethical requirements require professional accountants to comply with the fundamental principle of “objectivity” as described in the IFAC Code?

(ET2)

0/1

(3) Do the ethical requirements require professional accountants to comply with the fundamental principle of “professional competence and due care” as described in the IFAC Code?

(ET3)

0/1

(4) Do the ethical requirements require professional accountants to comply with the fundamental principle of “confidentiality” as described in the IFAC Code?

(ET4)

0/1

(5) Do the ethical requirements require professional accountants to comply with the fundamental principle of “professional behavior” as described in the IFAC Code?

(ET5)

0/1

(6) Are there specific requirements and guidance to assist members in identifying and resolving ethical issues?

(ET6)

0/1

Appendix 3: General Questions and Answers

Country

Professional accountancy organizations

PAO_general (1)

PAO_general (2)

PAO_general (3)

PAO_general (4)

PAO_general (5)

PAO_general (6)

Oversight

Education

Education

Education

Education

Ethics

Is there a program for investigating and disciplining members for misconduct?

Yes = 1; No = 0

Does the organization require members to complete professional accountancy education?

Yes = 1; No = 0

Does the organization require members to complete a practical experience requirement?

Yes = 1; No = 0

Does the organization require members to complete a final assessment?

Yes = 1; No = 0

Does the organization require members to maintain competence through CPD?

Yes = 1; No = 0

Are there established ethical requirements for members?

Yes = 1; No = 0

Argentina

Federación Argentina de Consejos Profesionales de Ciencias Económicas

1

1

0

0

0

1

Australia

CPA Australia

1

1

1

1

1

1

Australia

Institute of Public Accountants

1

1

1

1

1

1

Australia

The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia

1

1

1

1

1

1

Austria

Kammer der Wirtschaftstreuhänder

1

0

1

1

1

1

Belgium

Institut des Réviseurs d’Entreprises

1

0

1

1

1

1

Belgium

IEC-IAB

1

0

1

1

1

1

Brazil

Conselho Federal de Contabilidade (CFC)

1

1

0

0

1

1

Canada

The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants

1

1

1

1

1

1

Canada

Certified General Accountants Association of Canada

1

1

1

1

1

1

Canada

Certified Management Accountants of Canada

1

1

1

1

1

1

Chile

Colegio de Contadores de Chile

1

1

0

0

0

1

Denmark

FSR—danske revisorer

1

1

1

1

1

1

Finland

HTM-tilintarkastajat—GRM—revisorer ry

0

1

1

1

1

1

France

Conseil Supérieur de l’Ordre des Experts-Comptables

1

1

1

1

1

1

Germany

Wirtschaftsprüferkammer (WPK)

1

0

1

1

1

1

Greece

Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Greece (SOEL)

1

1

1

1

0

1

Hong Kong

Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants

1

1

1

1

1

1

Indonesia

Indonesian Institute of Accountants or Ikatan Akuntan Indonesia (IAI)

1

1

0

1

1

1

Ireland

The Institute of Certified Public Accountants in Ireland

1

1

1

0

1

1

Ireland

Chartered Accountants Ireland

1

1

1

1

1

1

Ireland

Accounting Technicians Ireland

1

1

1

0

0

1

Israel

Institute of Certified Public Accountants in Israel

1

1

1

1

0

1

Italy

Consiglio Nazionale dei Dottori Commercialisti e degli Esperti Contabili

1

1

1

1

1

1

Japan

The Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants

1

1

1

1

1

1

Luxembourg

Ordre des Experts-Comptables du Luxembourg

1

1

1

1

1

1

Luxembourg

Institut des Réviseurs d’Entreprises

1

1

1

1

1

1

Malaysia

The Malaysian Institute of Certified Public Accountants

1

1

1

1

1

1

Malaysia

Malaysian Institute of Accountants

1

1

1

0

1

1

Mexico

Instituto Mexicano de Contadores Públicos, A.C.

1

1

0

0

1

1

Netherlands

Koninklijk Nederlands Instituut van Registeraccountants (Royal NIVRA)

1

1

1

0

1

1

New Zealand

New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants

1

1

1

1

1

1

Norway

Den Norske Revisorforening (DnR)

1

1

1

1

1

1

Philippines

Philippine Institute of Certified Public Accountants

1

1

0

1

1

1

Poland

National Chamber of Statutory Auditors

1

1

1

1

1

1

Singapore

Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Singapore

1

1

1

1

1

1

South Africa

The South African Institute of Professional Accountants

1

1

1

1

1

1

South Korea

Korean Institute of Certified Public Accountants

1

1

1

1

1

1

Spain

Instituto de Censores Jurados de Cuentas de España

1

1

1

1

1

1

Sweden

Far

1

1

1

1

1

1

Switzerland

Treuhand-Kammer-Swiss Institute of Certified Accountants and Tax Consultants

1

1

1

1

1

1

Taiwan

Federation of CPA Associations of Chinese Taiwan

0

1

1

1

1

1

Thailand

Federation of Accounting Professions

1

1

1

1

0

1

UK

Association of Accounting Technicians (AAT)

1

0

1

1

1

1

UK

The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland

1

1

1

1

1

1

UK

The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales

1

1

1

1

1

1

UK

The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants

1

1

1

1

1

1

UK

Institute of Financial Accountants

1

1

1

0

1

1

UK

The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy

1

1

1

1

1

1

UK

The Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA)

1

1

1

1

1

1

USA

AICPA

1

1

1

1

1

1

  1. This appendix tabulates each PAO’s responses to all six general questions. To obtain PAO_general, we first average the four education questions to a score between 0 and 1, and we then compute the mean score of the three major PAO components, including (1) investigation and discipline (Oversight), (2) educational requirements (Education), and (3) ethical requirements (Ethics). The weights for the three components are the same when calculating PAO_general. For example, Thailand has one PAO. We first compute an Education score by averaging Thailand’s scores on the four education questions, that is, (1 + 1+1 + 0)/4 = 0.75. We then compute PAO_general as the mean score of the three PAO components, Oversight, Education, and Ethics: (1 + 0.75 + 1)/3 = 0.92. For countries with more than one PAO, we average the PAO_general score for each of the PAOs in a country to obtain the overall country-level measure of PAOs development.

Appendix 4: Variable Definitions

Stock market development variables

 MARKDEV

Overall stock market development measured as the mean of the following five standardized market development variables covering the 2007–2012 period

 (1) STC

Stock market capitalization relative to GDP for the 2007–2012 period; obtained from IMD WORLD COMPETITIVENESS

 (2) STC_MIN

Stock market capitalization held by minority shareholders deflated by GDP for the 2007–2012 period. Market capitalization held by minority shareholders is computed as the product of a stock exchange’s market capitalization (in US$ billion) and the average percentage of common shares not owned by the top three shareholders in the 10 largest non-financial privately owned domestic listed firms. Stock market capitalization is obtained from IMD WORLD COMPETITIVENESS, and the percentage of shares not owned by the top three shareholders is obtained from the Capital IQ Compustat Database

 (3) N_LIST

Number of listed domestic companies deflated by population (in millions) for the 2007–2012 period; obtained from IMD WORLD COMPETITIVENESS

 (4) N_NEWLIST

Number of newly listed domestic companies deflated by population (in millions) for the 2007–2012 period; obtained from IMD WORLD COMPETITIVENESS

 (5) TRADE

Per-capita annual value traded on the stock market (in US$) for the 2007–2012 period; obtained from IMD WORLD COMPETITIVENESS

Professional accountancy organizations (PAOs) variables—from IFAC

 PAO_general

Overall country-level PAO measure based on the responses of International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) member countries to all of the general questions included in the questionnaire (Assessment of the Regulatory and Standard-Setting Framework Questionnaire) designed by IFAC to assess the level of development of a country’s PAOs. See Appendix 2 for more details on the measure and general questions. Data are available for all 36 sample countries

 PAO_specific

Overall country-level PAOs measure based on the responses of IFAC member countries to all of the specific questions included on the questionnaire (Assessment of the Regulatory and Standard-Setting Framework Questionnaire) designed by IFAC to assess the level of development of a country’s PAOs. See Appendix 2 for more details on the measure and specific questions. Data are available for 18 sample countries

 PAO_Oversight

The investigation and discipline dimension of the PAOs measure, which is calculated as the average score of all answers to the specific questions in the investigation and discipline part of the IFAC questionnaire. It captures the compliance of a country’s PAOs with IFAC requirements for mechanisms that investigate and discipline professionals who fail to exercise and maintain professional standards and related obligations

 PAO_Education

The education dimension of the PAOs measure, which is calculated as the average score of all of the answers to the specific questions in the education part of the IFAC questionnaire. It captures the compliance of a country’s PAOs with international standards and other pronouncements issued by the International Accounting Education Standards Board (IAESB), an independent standard-setting body supported by IFAC

 PAO_Ethics

The ethics dimension of the PAOs measure, which is calculated as the average score of all of the answers to the specific questions in the ethics part of the IFAC questionnaire. It captures the compliance of a country’s PAOs with the code of ethics for professional accountants issued by the International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants (IESBA), an independent standard-setting body supported by IFAC

 PAO_big4share1(2)

Market share of Big 4 auditors in a country-year calculated as the total revenue (assets) of firms audited by Big 4 auditors divided by the total revenue (assets) of all firms in each country-year. Big 4 auditor data are from the Capital IQ Compustat Database

Earnings management variables

 SMOOTH_sd

Median ratio of firm-level standard deviations of operating income and operating cash flow for each country-year. Operating income and operating cash flow are both scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year. The measure is multiplied by −1 such that a higher value means more smoothing and lower earnings quality. All data are from the Capital IQ Compustat Database

 SMOOTH_corr

Spearman correlation between a change in accruals and change in cash flow from operations for a country-year. The change in accruals and cash flow from operations are both scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year. The measure is multiplied by −1 such that a higher value means more smoothing and lower earnings quality. All data are from the Capital IQ Compustat Database

Restatement variable

 RESTATE

The ratio of total observations with restated financial statements to the total number of observations in each country-year. Restatement data are from the Capital IQ Compustat Database

Informativeness of annual earnings announcement variable

 AbsCAR

Mean of firm-level absolute CAR around the annual earnings announcements for each country-year. Firm-level absolute CAR is the absolute value of the two-day market-adjusted cumulative return in percentage form during the [0, +1] window, where day 0 is the annual earnings announcement date. All data are from the Capital IQ Compustat Database

Other country-level variables

 DISCLOSURE

Measure of a stock exchange’s enforcement of disclosure rules constructed by Frost et al. (2006). It measures the extent to which disciplinary actions are enforced by a stock exchange when listed firms issue false financial statements and misleading material announcements

 LEGPRO

Overall rule of law and investor protection in each country calculated as the mean of the seven following standardized rule of law and investor protection variables

 (1) RL_F

Legal structure and property rights, including judicial independence, impartial courts, protection of property rights, military interference in the rule of law and politics, integrity of the legal system, legal enforcement of contracts, regulatory restrictions on the sale of real property, reliability of the police, and the business costs of crime. Data source: “Economic Freedom of the World” issued by the Fraser Institute; see http://www.freetheworld.com/datasets_efw.html

 (2) RL_H

Rule of law, including property rights (i.e., recognition of private property rights and an effective rule of law to protect them, which are vital features of a fully functioning market economy) and freedom from corruption (i.e., the failure of integrity in the economic system, a distortion by which individuals or special-interest groups are able to gain at the expense of the whole). Data source: “Index of Economic Freedom” issued by the Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal; see http://www.heritage.org/index/explore?view=by-region-country-year

 (3) RL_W

A rule of law measure that captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society and the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, along with the likelihood of crime and violence. Data source: “Worldwide Governance Indicators” published by the World Bank; see http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports

 (4) IP

Strength of investor protection index. Data source: “Doing Business Indicators” issued by the International Finance Corporation and World Bank; see http://www.doingbusiness.org/custom-query

 (5) SR

Sufficient protection of shareholders’ rights. Data source: “World Competitiveness Yearbook” issued by the International Institute for Management Development (IMD); see https://www.worldcompetitiveness.com/OnLine/App/Index.htm.

 (6) MIP_G

Protection of minority shareholders’ interests. Data source: “Global Competiveness Index” issued by the World Economic Forum; see http://www.weforum.org/issues/competitiveness-0/gci2012-data-platform

 (7) IP_G

Strength of investor protection. Data source: “Global Competiveness Index” issued by the World Economic Forum; see http://www.weforum.org/issues/competitiveness-0/gci2012-data-platform

 ENGLISH

English common law: an indicator variable equal to 1 if a country’s legal system is patterned on English law and 0 otherwise. Data source: La Porta et al. (2006)

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Huang, H., Kong, X. & Tsang, A. Professional Accountancy Organizations and Stock Market Development. J Bus Ethics 157, 231–260 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-017-3665-5

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-017-3665-5

Keywords

Navigation