Abstract
We extend the citizen candidate model of electoral competition with sincere voting to allow for k ≥ 2 states of aggregate uncertainty. We discuss and characterize the equilibrium set in this framework. We provide conditions for the existence of two-party equilibria when k = 2 and show that the policies of the two parties in any such equilibrium are not only divergent but that the parties are extremist: when the political mood is left-wing, the left-wing party wins decisively with a platform that is to the left of the left-wing median voter, while when the political mood is right-wing, the right-wing party wins decisively with a platform that is to the right of the right-wing median voter. We then provide conditions under which such equilibria remain robust for an arbitrary value of k.
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Brusco, S., Roy, J. Aggregate uncertainty in the citizen candidate model yields extremist parties. Soc Choice Welf 36, 83–104 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0467-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0467-4